

Quoting APFN <APFN@apfn.org>:

> December 7, 1941 - 'a day which will live in infamy'
>
> <http://disc.server.com/discussion.cgi?disc=149495;article=47208;title=APFN>
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> THE PEARL HARBOR DECEPTION
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> http://www.apfn.org/apfn/pearl_harbor.htm
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> The Bombing of Pearl Harbor
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> On the evening of December 6, 1941, Franklin Delano Roosevelt, the
> president of the United States, received a message intercepted by the
> U.S.
> Navy. Sent from Tokyo to the Japanese embassy in Washington, the
> message was
> encrypted in the top-level Japanese "purple code." But that was no
> problem.
> The Americans had cracked the code long before that.
>
> It was imperative that the president see the message right away
> because it
> revealed that the Japanese, under the heavy pressure of Western
> economic sanctions, were terminating relations with the United
> States.
> Roosevelt read the thirteen-part transmission, looked up and
> announced, "This
> means war."
>
> He then did a very strange thing for a president in his situation.
>
> Nothing.
>
> The Japanese secret declaration of war never reached the people who
> needed
> to hear it the most - Admiral Husband E. Kimmel, commander in chief of
> the
> United States Pacific Fleet at Pearl Harbor, Hawaii, and the unit's
> commanding
> general, Walter Short. Pearl Harbor, it was common military
> knowledge, was
> where the Japanese would strike. If they struck.
>
> At dawn the next morning a Japanese squadron bombed Pearl Harbor
> and the
> surprise attack was just that, a complete surprise. At least to
> Kimmel and
> Short and the 4,575 American servicemen who died.
>
> It may not have been such a surprise to Generals George C. Marshall
> and
> Leonard T. Gerow and Admirals Harold R. Stark and Richmond Kelly
> Turner.
> They were the military's top brass in Washington and the only

officers

> authorized to forward such sensitive intelligence to outlying
commanders. But
> the decoded war declaration did not reach Kimmel and Short until the
morning,
> with the attack well underway off in the Pacific.
>
> Marshall and Stark, supreme commanders of the U.S. Army and Navy
> respectively, later testified that the message was not forwarded to
Kimmel and
> Short because the Hawaiian commanders had received so many
intercepted
> Japanese messages that another one would simply confuse them.
>
> Internal army and navy inquiries in 1944 held Stark and Marshall
derelict of
> duty for keeping the Hawaiian commanders in the dark. But the
military buried
> those findings. As far as the public knew, the final truth was
uncovered by
> the Roberts Commission, headed by Justice Owen Roberts of the Supreme
Court,
> and convened eleven days after the attack. Like another
> investigative commission headed by a Supreme Court justice on a
different
> topic more than twenty years later, the Roberts Commission appeared to
have
> identified its culprits in advance and gerrymandered its inquiries to
make the
> suspects appear guilty. The scapegoats were Kimmel and Short, who
were both
> publicly crucified, forced to retire, and denied the open hearings
they
> desired. One of the Roberts Commission panelists, Admiral William
Standley,
> would call Roberts's performance "crooked as a snake."
>
> There were eight investigations of Pearl Harbor altogether. The
> most spectacular was a joint House-Senate probe that reiterated the
Roberts
> Commission findings. At those hearings, Marshall and Stark testified,
> incredibly, that they could not remember where they were the night
the war
> declaration came in. But a close friend of Frank Knox, the secretary
of the
> Navy, later revealed that Knox, Stark, and Marshall spent most of
that night
> in the White House with Roosevelt awaiting the bombing of Pearl
Harbor and the
> chance for America to join World War II.
>
> A widespread coverup ensued. A few days after Pearl Harbor,
> reports historian John Toland, Marshall told his top officers,
"Gentlemen,
> this goes to the grave with us." General Short once considered
Marshall his
> friend, only to learn that the chief of staff was the agent of his

frame-up.

> Short once remarked that he pitied his former pal because Marshall was the

> only general who wouldn't be able to write an autobiography.

>

> There were multiple warnings of the Pearl Harbor attack concealed from the

> commanders at Pearl Harbor. The Winds Code was perhaps the most shocking. That

> was an earlier transmission, in a fake weather report broadcast on a Japanese

> short-wave station, of the words higashi no kaze ame. Which means, "east wind,

> rain." The Americans already knew that this was the Japanese code for war with

> the United States. The response of top U.S. military officials? To deny that

> the "winds" message existed and to attempt to destroy all records of its

> reception. But it did exist. And it was received.

>

> Completely apart from the cloak and dagger of cryptography, the Australian intelligence service, three days before the attack, spotted the

> Japanese fleet of aircraft carriers heading for Hawaii. A warning went to

> Washington where it was dismissed by Roosevelt as a politically motivated

> rumor circulated by Republicans.

>

> A British double agent, Dusko Popov, who siphoned information from Germany, learned of the Japanese intentions and desperately tried to warn

> Washington, to no avail. And there were others.

>

> Why would Roosevelt and the nation's top military commanders sacrifice the

> U.S. Pacific Fleet, not to mention thousands of servicemen - an act that could

> justifiably be deemed treason? They had concluded long before Pearl Harbor

> that war against the Axis powers was a necessity. The American public would

> surely bring the public around.

>

> "This was the president's problem," wrote Rear Admiral Robert A. Theobald who commanded Pearl Harbor's destroyers, "and his solution was based

> upon the simple fact that, while it takes two to make a fight, either one

> may start it."

>

> "A Small group of men, revered and held to be most honorable by millions," wrote Toland, "had convinced themselves that it was necessary to

> act dishonorably for the good of their nation - and incited the war that Japan

> had tried to avoid."
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> <http://www.carpenoctem.tv/cons/pearl.html>
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> PEARL HARBOR MOTHER OF ALL CONSPIRACIES
> <http://www.geocities.com/Pentagon/6315/pearl.html>
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> PearlHarbor remains 'a day which will live in infamy'
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> <http://news.google.com/news?hl=en&ie=ISO-8859-1&edition=us&q=December+7%2C+1941&btnG=Search+News>
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> The Pearl Harbor Deception
> by Robert Stinnett
> Independent Institute
> December 7, 2003
> <http://www.antiwar.com/orig2/stinnett1.html>
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> Two questions about the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor have
ignited a
> controversy that has burned for 60 years: Did U.S. naval
cryptographers crack
> the Japanese naval codes before the attack? Did Japanese warships
and their
> commanding admirals break radio silence at sea before the attack?
>
> If the answer to both is "no," then Pearl Harbor was indeed a
> surprise attack described by President Franklin D. Roosevelt as a
"Day of
> Infamy. "The integrity of the U.S. government regarding Pearl Harbor
remains
> solid.
>
> But if the answer is "yes," then hundreds of books, articles,
movies, and TV
> documentaries based on the "no" answer - and the integrity of
> the federal government - go down the drain. If the Japanese naval
codes
> were intercepted, decoded, and translated into English by U.S. naval
> cryptographers prior to Pearl Harbor, then the Japanese naval attacks
on
> American Pacific military bases were known in advance among the
highest levels
> of the American government.
>
> During the 60 years, the truthful answers were secreted in
> bomb-proof vaults, withheld from two congressional Pearl Harbor
investigations
> and from the American people. As recently as 1995, the Joint
Congressional
> Investigation conducted by Sen. Strom Thurmond and Rep. Floyd Spence,
was
> denied access to a naval storage vault in Crane, Indiana, containing
documents

> that could settle the questions.
>
> Americans were told of U.S. cryptographers' success in cracking
> pre- Pearl Harbor Japanese diplomatic codes, but not a word has been
> officially uttered about their success in cracking Japanese military
codes.
>
> In the mid-1980s I learned that none of the hundreds of thousands
> of Japanese military messages obtained by the U.S. monitor stations
prior
> to Pearl Harbor were introduced or discussed during the congressional
> investigation of 1945-46. Determined to penetrate the secrets of Pearl
Harbor,
> I filed Freedom of Information (FOIA) requests with the US Navy. Navy
> officials in Washington released a few pre-Pearl Harbor documents to
me in
> 1985. Not satisfied by the minuscule release, I continued filing
FOIAs.
>
> Finally in 1993, the U.S. Naval Security Group Command, the
custodian of the
> Crane Files, agreed to transfer the records to National Archives
> in Washington, D.C. In the winter of 1993-94 the files were
transported by
> truck convoy to a new government facility built on the College Park
campus of
> the University of Maryland inside the Washington Beltway, named
Archives
> II. Mr. Clarence Lyons, then head of the Military Reference Branch,
> released the first batch of Crane Files to me in the Steny Hoyer
Research
> Center at Archives II in January 1995.
>
> Apparently, the pre-Pearl Harbor records had not been seen or
reviewed since
> 1941. Though refiled in pH-safe archival boxes by Lyons' staff, some
of the
> Crane documents were covered with dust, tightly bunched together in
the boxes
> and tied with unusual waxed twine. Lyons confirmed the records were
received
> from the U.S. Navy in that condition.
>
> It took me a year to evaluate the records. The information revealed
in the
> files was astonishing. It disclosed a Pearl Harbor story hidden from
the
> public. I believed the story should be told to the American people.
> The editors of Simon & Schuster/The Free Press published Day of
Deceit:
> The Truth About FDR and Pearl Harbor on December 7, 1999.
>
> Day of Deceit was well received by media book reviews and the
> on-line booksellers, Amazon.com and Barnes & Noble.com, earning a 70
> percent public approval rating. Day of Deceit continues among the top
ten
> bestsellers in the non-fiction Pearl Harbor book category, according

to
> Amazon.com and Barnes & Noble.com.
>
> About 30 percent of the reviews have discounted the book's
revelations. The
> leaders of the dispute include Stephen Budiansky, Edward Drea, and
David Kahn,
> all of whom have authored books or articles on code breaking. To
bolster their
> pre-Pearl Harbor theories, the trio violated journalistic ethics and
distorted
> the U.S. Navy's pre-Pearl Harbor paper trail. Their efforts cannot be
ignored.
> The trio has close ties to the National Security Agency, the overseer
of U.S.
> naval communications files. Kahn has appeared before NSA seminars.
The NSA has
> not honored my FOIA requests to disclose honorariums paid the seminar
> participants but has released records that confirm Kahn has been a
> participant.
>
> Immediately after Day of Deceit appeared in bookstores in 1999, NSA
began
> withdrawing pre-Pearl Harbor documents from the Crane Files housed in
Archives
> II. This means the government decided to continue 60 years of Pearl
Harbor
> censorship. As of January 2002, over two dozen NSA withdrawal notices
have
> triggered the removal of Pearl Harbor documents from
public inspection.
>
> The number of pages in the withdrawn documents appears to be in
> the hundreds. Among the records withdrawn are those of Admiral Harold
R.
> Stark, the 1941 Chief of Naval Operations, as well as crypto records
authored
> by Commander Joseph J. Rochefort, the chief cryptographer for the
Pacific
> Fleet at the time of Pearl Harbor. Under the Crane File transfer
agreement
> with National Archives, NSA has the legal right to withdraw any
document
> based on national defense concerns.
>
> Concurrent with the NSA withdrawals, Budiansky, with the aid of
Kahn and
> Drea, began a two-year media campaign to discredit the paper trail
of the U.S.
> naval documents that form the backbone of Day of Deceit. One of the
most
> egregious examples of ethical violations appeared in an article by
Kahn
> published in the New York Review of Books on November 2, 2000. In
that
> article, Kahn attempted to bolster his contention that Japanese
admirals and

> warships observed radio silence while en route to attack American
> Pacific bases. Kahn broke basic journalism ethics and rewrote a U.S.
Naval
> Communication Summary prepared by Commander Rochefort at his crypto
center
> located in the Pearl Harbor Naval Yard.
>
> About 1,000 intercepted Japanese naval radio messages formed the
basis of
> each Daily Summary written by Rochefort and his staff. The Japanese
> communication intelligence data contained in the messages was
summarized and
> delivered daily to Admiral Husband E. Kimmel, Commander-in-Chief of
the
> Pacific Fleet. Rochefort's summary of November 25, 1941 (Hawaii time)
was not
> to Kahn's liking. It revealed the Commander Carriers of the Imperial
Japanese
> Navy were not observing radio silence but were in "extensive
communications"
> with other Japanese naval forces whose admirals directly commanded
the
> forces involved in the Pearl Harbor attack. Because of the
International
> Dateline, the "extensive communications" mentioned in the summary
took place
> on November 26, 1941, Japan time, the exact day the Japanese carrier
force
> began its journey to Hawaii.
>
> In its entirety the Rochefort summary reads: "FOURTH FLEET - CinC.
> FourthFleet is still holding extensive communications with the
commander
> SubmarineFleet, the forces at Jaluit and Commander Carriers. His
other
> communications are with the Third, Fourth, and Fifth Base Forces."
>
> The meaning of the summary is unequivocal: The commanders of the
> powerful Japanese invasion, submarine, and carrier forces did not
observe
> radio silence as they maneuvered toward U.S. bases in Hawaii, Wake,
and Guam
> Islands in the Central Pacific. Instead they used radio transmitters
aboard
> their flagships and coordinated strategy and tactics with each other.
>
> The summary corroborates earlier findings by Pulitzer
> Prize-winning historian John Toland. In the late 1970s, Toland
interviewed
> personnel and obtained U.S. naval documents from San Francisco's
Twelfth Naval
> District that disclosed that the "extensive communications" were
intercepted
> by the radio direction finders of the U.S. Navy's West Coast
Communications
> Intelligence Network. Doubleday published Toland's account in 1982 as
Infamy:

> Pearl Harbor and its Aftermath.
>
> Yet in his NYRoB article Kahn deleted portions of the Rochefort
summary in
> the middle of the first sentence, profoundly diminishing its
> significance. Kahn's version: "Fourth Fleet is still holding
extensive
> communications with the Commander Submarine Fleet."
>
> Kahn violated basic journalism rules by deleting crucial words and
not using
> ellipsis to indicate a deletion. When I cited these ethical
violations to the
> editors of the NYRoB, Kahn offered an excuse and implied that
> Rochefort's summary was too long. "I had to condense my review," he
wrote.
>
> Kahn probably believes his deletion was insignificant because he
denies that
> the Commander Carriers were involved in the Pearl Harbor attack. "The
force
> that attacked Hawaii was not that of the Commander Carriers but the
First Air
> Fleet," he wrote in his reply to my Letter to the Editor of the NYRoB
> (February 8, 2001). Kahn revealed his ignorance of the Japanese
> naval organization. The First Air Fleet operated under Commander
Carriers,
> that is, Vice Admiral Chuichi Nagumo, who was in charge of the entire
Hawaii
> Operation.
>
> Captain A. James McCollum, USNR (Ret), who served in San
Francisco's Twelfth
> Naval District intelligence office (and later on the intelligence
staff of
> Fleet Admiral Chester Nimitz) accused Kahn of committing
> "journalistic crimes." "That critic, David Kahn, seems to have
deliberately
> distorted some facts and even altered quotations....," McCollum wrote
in his
> letter to the editors of the NYRoB on February 14, 2001. The letter
was never
> published.
>
> December 7, 1941 - 'a day which will live in infamy'
>
> <http://disc.server.com/discussion.cgi?disc=149495;article=47208;title=A>
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